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THE PARTNERSHIP OF
BENCH AND BAR'
EDWARD D. RE*

Y

OUR GRACIOUS INVITATION to deliver the Mr. Justice Robert H.

Jackson Lecture does me great honor. It is an honor, however,
which gives pause for a variety of reasons. Not only do I succeed a formidable array of outstanding scholars and jurists, as prior speakers, but I
also address a distinguished assemblage of state trial judges each of whom,
I am sure, is master within his field of the law. These facts constitute
a mandate to strive to bring you a message both significant and timely.
The administration of justice is the cause that brings us together.
Our common bond is the love of the law, respect for the courts, and
an understanding of the legal profession. Nothing less than the doing
of justice is our common mission. Each of us here is privileged to participate in an ageless process designed to achieve justice here on earth.
Also we share common goals and ideals, and reverence for the law as
an instrument of justice. "Justice," said Daniel Webster, in his eulogy of
Mr. Justice Joseph Story, "is the great interest of man on earth."
In that sense we may properly be regarded as "ministers of justice."
Yet we cannot lose sight of the reminder of Charles Evans Hughes, in
his Presidential address to the American Bar Association, "that the
justice to be administered is justiceaccording to law."'
I am confident that all of you must share my deep concern and
regret that so many topics could be chosen that reflect the crises in which
the administration of justice finds itself today. A sense of history will
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show that within our society and our profession there are seeds that permit both
self-evaluation and self-improvement. So I
speak not as an alarmist, nor even as a
reformer, but rather as one who has not
only conviction in our profession, but also
confidence in its ability to continue to perform the lofty mission of doing justice according to law.
Surely there is no thought of shirking
responsibility, or neglecting problems requiring solution. There is, however, an
awareness that the problems are not really
new. Preceding generations also have been
faced with the responsibility of adjusting
and improving in order to meet the needs
of a developing and evolving society.
This awareness seems indispensable in
our democratic society whose ideals and
lofty goals, as expressed by our founding
fathers, were admittedly only aspirational.
Such a society, it must be remembered, is
not a fully developed society, but rather one
that is, in a sense, unfinished, still developing and evolving.
Anyone concerned with the administration of justice would profit greatly by reading Dean Roscoe Pound's notable address
entitled: The Causes of Popular Dissatis2
faction with the Administration of Justice.
Delivered as far back as 1906, at the 29th
annual meeting of the American Bar Association in St. Paul, Dean Pound's address
has been described by Dean Wigmore as

2 Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A.
REP. 395 (1906).

"the spark that kindled the white flame of
3
progress."
Writing in 1937, Dean Wigmore stated
that "the great result [of Dean Pound's address] was that the soul of the profession
had been touched." '4 There can be no doubt
that, for more than a generation, that address had a profound influence on the improvement of the administration of justice
in America.
Dean Pound observed that "[d]issatisfaction with the administration of justice is
as old as law." 5 He then set forth the
causes of dissatisfaction under four broad
categories:
(1) Causes for dissatisfaction with any
legal system, (2) causes lying in the peculiarities of our Anglo-American legal
system, (3) causes lying in our American
judicial organization and procedure, and
(4) causes lying in the environment of
our judicial administration.6
There is so much in Dean Pound's
memorable address, that is so valuable and
so pertinent today, that one is tempted,
almost beyond endurance, to treat and
comment upon all of the points that he so
wisely and eloquently raised. I have restrained myself, however, and have chosen
to discuss only one small phase of his
critique. That phase pertains to what is
commonly called the adversary system.
The adversary system has been described

3 Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of
1906, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 176 (1937).
4 Id. at 178.

5 Pound, supra note 2.
6 Id. at 397.
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as that competitive system for the administration of justice that prevails in our
country under which "the judge is relatively
passive, listening, moderating, and passing
on what is offered to him."' I have chosen
to discuss the adversary system because its
misunderstanding and abuse have seriously
affected, if not distorted, the proper role of
the lawyer in the American system of the
administration of justice. Hence I have
chosen to speak of the role of the lawyer in
the decision-making process. Since I deem
the role of the lawyer to be crucial in the
judicial process, I have labeled my remarks: The Partnership of Bench and Bar.
Under the second "main head" entitled:
''causes lying in the peculiarities of our
Anglo-American legal system," Dean Pound
discussed "the common law doctrine of
contentious procedure which turns litigation
into a game." He observed that a "no less
potent source of irritation lies in our American exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure."
Noting that it is probably only a survival
of the days when a lawsuit was a fight between two clans, and that it is peculiar to
Anglo-American law, Dean Pound declared
that "it has been strongly curbed in modern
English practice."" After observing that
"with us, it is not merely in full acceptance," but that "its collateral possibilities
have been cultivated to the furthest extent,"
Dean Pound stated:
Hence in America we take it as a matter

Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 405, 409 (1953).
8 Pound, supra note 2, at 404.
9 Id. at 405.
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of course that a judge should be a mere
umpire, to pass upon objections and hold
counsel to the rules of the game, and that
the parties should fight out their own game
in their own way without judicial interference. We resent such interference as
unfair, even when in the interests of justice.
The idea that procedure must of necessity
be wholly contentious disfigures our judicial
administration at every point. It leads the
most conscientious judge to feel that he is
merely to decide the contest, as counsel
present it, according to the rules of the
game, not to search independently for
truth and justice. It leads counsel to forget
that they are officers of the court and to
deal with the rules of law and procedure
exactly as the professional football coach
with the rules of the sport. It leads to
exertion to "get error into the record"
rather than to dispose of the controversy
finally and upon its merits. It turns witnesses, and especially expert witnesses, into
partisans pure and simple. It leads to
sensational cross-examinations "to affect
credit," which have made the witness stand
"the slaughter house of reputations." It
prevents the trial court from restraining
the bullying of witnesses and creates a
general dislike, if not fear, of the witness
function which impairs the administration
of justice. . . . The inquiry is not, What
do substantive law and justice require?
Instead, the inquiry is, Have the rules of
the game been carried out strictly? 10
Dean Pound's indictment and bill of particulars were devastating when first uttered.

I have eliminated several counts that are
no longer true today, and that have been
cured by modern codes of practice and procedure. Enough, however, remains of the
contentious spirit to continue to give life

7

10 Id. at 405-06.
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to the charges pronounced in 1906. This, of
course, means that much more remains to
be done in rekindling the spirit of professional responsibility in bench and bar so
that each may appreciate the proper role
that it must perform in our system for the
administration of justice.
But let us turn again to Dean Pound:
The effect of our exaggerated contentious
procedure is not only to irritate parties,
witnesses and jurors in particular cases,
but to give to the whole community a false
notion of the purpose and end of law.
Hence comes, in large measure, the modern
American race to beat the law."
The learned scholar and keen observer
concluded his discussion of the "irritation"
caused by the "exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure" with the
following crucial sentence: "Thus the
courts, instituted to administer justice according to law, are made agents or abettors
12
of lawlessness.'
Dean Pound, however, was no prophet
of doom, and referred to some of the events
that gave hope for improvement. He mentioned our law schools that in his opinion
were "rivaling the achievements of Bologna
and of Bourges to promote scientific study
of the law."'1 3 He also referred to the "active Bar Associations in every state to revive professional feeling and throw off the
yoke of commercialism.' 1 4 Specifically,
Dean Pound looked forward to "deliver-

11 Id. at 406.
12 Id.
33 Id. at 417.
14 Id.

ance from the sporting theory of justice,"
and a "near future when our courts will
be swift and certain agents of justice, whose
decisions will be acquiesced in and respected by all."' 15
All of us share that profound hope, and
all of us, I am sure, are working mightily
to help achieve it. I should like to refer to
certain areas where progress may fairly be
reported, and then to mention areas which
require additional effort and our continuing
attention.
When we speak of the administration of
justice, we of course must speak of lawyers
and judges, for what they do, in large measure, is the administration of justice. Therefore, when our attention is directed to the
quality of the administration of justice, we
ought properly to focus upon the manner in
which lawyers and judges do their work.
In evaluating the quality of the administration of justice, we, in effect, evaluate, primarily, the qualitative performance of
lawyers and judges. Admittedly, lawyers
and judges are not the only participants.
The process necessarily requires the participation of others whose services may indeed
be indispensable. None, however, possesses
the prestige, influence and ability to effect
change and improvement, as bench or bar.
Although it is the proud boast of all
Americans that ours is a "government of
laws and not of men," it is axiomatic that
justice is administered by men, and that
the quality of the administration of justice
necessarily depends upon the quality of
the men who administer it. Emerson has

15 Id.
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said that what we are speaks louder than
what we say. I should like to add that
what we are manifests itself in everything
we do. Quite properly, therefore, the attention of all citizens should initially focus
upon the quality of the judiciary. Perspective, however, requires that the inquiry must
be broader than the judiciary. An appreciation of the proper role of the lawyer in our
system for the administration of justice will
cause us to agree with the assertion of
Mr. Justice Vanderbilt, a distinguished law
school dean and president of the American
Bar Association, that a "judicial system in
the long run can be no better than its
bar."1' 6 By this statement Justice Vanderbilt
was not merely referring to the obvious
fact that the judges are selected from among
the bar. Rather, he was referring to the
key role that the bar, i.e., the lawyer, performs in the judicial system, for he spoke
of the "essential part" of the lawyer, and
urged every law student to "know as soon
as possible what are the professional responsibilities of The Legal Profession."17
At this juncture we are reminded of
what Mr. Justice Cardozo called the "Paradoxes of Legal Science." 18s Quoting
Demogue, the learned jurist pointed out
that "[t]o bring about reconciliations is the
great work of jurists." 19 In his Carpentier
lecture, delivered at Columbia in 1928, Mr.
Justice Cardozo spoke of the "fundamental

16 A.

VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
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opposites that clash and are reconciled."
Stated in broad terms, he noted that "rest
competes with motion, permanence with
flux, stability with progress." He quoted
Alfred North Whitehead to indicate that
these antitheses are "inherent in the very
nature of things," and that they are not
peculiar to the law. Its special applicability
to law is of course of particular importance
to us, for in the words of Demogue, "[t]o
bring about reconciliations is the great work
of jurists."' 20 Stability and progress, precedent and equity, justice that is universal and
yet individual, are but a few of the "opposites" that the jurist must "reconcile" if
his work is to be qualitatively acceptable.
It is against this background of the paradoxical nature of the law that one ought to
examine the paradoxical role of the lawyer
in our society. In a Carpentier lecture of a
subsequent generation, Professor Elliott
Cheatham referred to the American lawyer
as "a paradox within paradoxes."' 21 Like
Dean Pound before him, he too spoke of
the paradox, if not oddity, of the adversary
system that prevails for the administration
of justice. Professor Cheatham calls attention to the anomaly that "a trial, which the
state employs in settling unresolved controversies, is not a cooperative effort by state
agencies to determine the facts and apply
the law." He notes that in the adversary
system "[t]he lawyers are the active agents
who investigate, present, and urge their
views of the facts and the law."'22 In this
system, Professor Cheatham describes the

ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

26-27 (1952).

17

Id.

18

Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, in

SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CAR-

DOZO 251 (M. Hall ed. 1947).

19 Id. at 255.

20 Id.
21 E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 4
(1963).
22 Id.
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role of the judge "the only impartial participant" as being "passive-listening, moderating, and passing on what is submitted to
him.,,-'
Clearly, under the system described, the
role of the lawyer is crucial. And here we
can best appreciate the paradoxical and
conflicting nature of his role. Professor
Cheatham states it well:
Though engaged in the public function of

the administration of law, and its most
influential participant, he is privately retained by one side, and he aids, guides,
and defends that side alone. While called
an officer of the court, he is a partisan
representative relying on private retainers
24
for his livelihood.
What is required under this system is
beautifully set forth by Professor Cheatham,
and I shall adopt his words as the text upon
which to build my thesis.
Under this system something more is
required than wise and just laws. Men
expert in the law are needed to individualize the law, to apply it, to employ it,
and even to develop it in concrete cases.
In court, where the law is graphically applied, the work of lawyers makes this need
manifest. In our country especially the
need for lawyers in court cases is great.
In no other nation does the representative
of the public, the judge, have so limited
a role in court, and the partisan representatives, the lawyers for the parties, so domi25
nant a part.
Surely it can be seen at a glance that the

23 Id.
24 Id. at 4-5.

25 Id. at 5.

adversary system that prevails in the trial
and appeal of cases, extols the role of the
lawyer. It would seem clear, therefore, that,
as long as the system is retained, no effective improvements may be achieved without
improving the qualitative contribution of
the lawyer. Necessarily, this implies an
awareness of the key role of the lawyer,
and an appreciation of the responsibilities
that he must fulfill if the system is to work
effectively as a device designed to achieve
justice according to law.
It must be noted that few would wish to
discard the adversary system. Dean Pound,
for example, only decried the American
"exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure. ' 26 Since the examination
of witnesses is the function of the lawyer,
the system is best suited to preserve both
the reality and appearance of judicial impartiality which is indispensable for the
continued respect that must be enjoyed by
the judiciary. Most thoughtful observers
still believe that "the interested striving of
two contending parties is, in the long run,
an infinitely better agency for the ascertainment of truth than any species of paternalistic inquiry."27 Yet, it must be constantly
remembered that the goal is the ascertainment of truth, and that the mission is the
doing of justice. The system must be made
to reveal truth and illuminate. It cannot be
the instrument of foreclosing proper inquiry
and obscuring vital areas requiring examination.
Experience has shown that the adversary

26 See notes 8 & II supra (emphasis added).
27 Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure 1, 18 ILL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1923).
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system or process will achieve its goal, and
fulfill its lofty mission, only when all of
the participants fully perform their professional responsibilities. More particularly, it
can only serve as an instrument of justice
if counsel for both sides adhere to proper
standards of professional responsibility and
competence. Under this system, competence
is no mere desideratum; rather, it is the indispensable quality that is required to make
it effective, worthy of our confidence, and
to justify its preservation.
Having highlighted the role of the lawyer,
and having alluded to the indispensable
requirement of competence, I wish to mention certain hopeful signs of progress.
Since our subject essentially involves an
appreciation of professional responsibility,
the most recent accomplishment pertains to
the new Code of Professional Responsibility
approved by the American Bar Association
in 1969. This Code, the product of almost
five years of work by the Association's
Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards, represents a comprehensive restatement of the former Canons of Professional Ethics. Most of the principles and
concepts embodied in the old canons, and
the opinions and decisions based upon
them, have been embodied in the new Code.
The Code contains nine canons with
ethical considerations and disciplinary rules
under each canon. The canons constitute
brief, general statements of subject matter,
embodying the general concepts from which
are derived the ethical considerations and
disciplinary rules. The ethical considerations are of an aspirational nature, and
represent objectives or ideals toward which
every lawyer should strive. In many specific
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situations they constitute a body of principles upon which a lawyer may rely for
guidance. The disciplinary rules, however,
unlike the ethical considerations, are mandatory in character and state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall. A violation of a disciplinary rule
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
Although the Code does not prescribe either
disciplinary procedures or penalties for violations of a disciplinary rule, an enforcing
agency may find interpretive guidance in
the basic principles embodied in the canons
and the objectives reflected in the ethical
considerations.
Of particular relevance to our subject is
the new Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 provides that
"A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Competently." Especially pertinent is Ethical Consideration 6-1 that states that "because of his vital role in the legal process,
a lawyer should act with competence and
proper care in representing clients." It also
states that "[h]e should strive to become
and remain proficient in his practice and
should accept employment only in matters
which he is or intends to become competent
to handle." Under Canon 6, Disciplinary
Rule 6-101 deals specifically with "Failing
to Act Competently." It provides that:
(A)

A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he
knows or should know that he is
not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle
it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances.

THE PARTNERSHIP OF BENCH AND BAR

The foregoing canon and disciplinary
rule should be read in conjunction with
the ethical considerations set forth under
Canon 7 which provides that "A Lawyer
Should Represent A Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law." Under the
heading of the "Duty of the Lawyer to
the Adversary System of Justice," Ethical
Consideration 7-19, after stating that our
legal system provides for the adjudication
of disputes governed by the rules of substantive, evidentiary and procedural law,
states the following concerning our adversary system:
An adversary presentation counters the
natural human tendency to judge too
swiftly in terms of the familiar that which
is not yet fully known; the advocate, by
his zealous preparation and presentation of
facts and law, enables the tribunal to come
to the hearing with an open and neutral
mind and to render impartial judgments.
It adds that: "The duty of a lawyer
to his client and his duty to the legal system
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law."
Perhaps most germane to the point that
I wish to emphasize is Ethical Consideration 7-20 that states:
In order to function properly, our adjudicatory process requires an informed,
impartial tribunal capable of administering
justice promptly and efficiently according
to procedures that command public confidence and respect. Not only must there
be competent, adverse presentation of
evidence and issues, but a tribunal must
be aided by rules appropriate to an effective and dignified process.

cess can only function well if the impartial
tribunal has been "informed." This necessarily requires a "competent, adverse presentation of evidence and issues." The
recognition by the Code, and through the
Code, the organized Bar, of the key role
of the lawyer in informing the tribunal is,
in my opinion, one of the major progressive
features of the Code. It is a major feature
because it places the requirement for the
competent handling of a case in its proper
perspective. Its importance is not limited to
the protection of the rights of the client,
but is acknowledged and treated as an essential element in the adjudicatory or decisional process. It is placed in the context
that the decisional process "requires an
informed" and impartial tribunal. Too often
there is stressed the element of impartiality
at the expense of information and enlightenment. Impartiality implies a judicial attitude
of detachment and neutrality between the
parties. It means not favoring one litigant
over the other, and that judicial behavior
and conduct ought never even appear to be
partisan. It does not mean disinterest or insensibility to the ends of justice. The ideal
of impartiality is separate from the necessity
of being adequately informed. The Code
highlights the responsibility of the lawyer
in "informing" the tribunal.
Surely it is not necessary before this
audience to indicate the overwhelming importance of facts, and how the court, in the
words of the late Professor Llewellyn, is
interested "in discovering, from and in the
facts, where sense and justice lie." 2 8 The

28 Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counsel-

Clearly, therefore, the adjudicatory pro-

ling and Advocacy, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167
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responsibility of counsel competently to
present the facts of a case cannot be disputed. Obviously the court is not expected
to know the facts. Apart from the doctrine
of judicial notice, cases are decided on the
basis of the record made at the trial. Nor
may the appellate court consider matters
not set forth in the certified record.2'
What is important for us to note is that
counsel's responsibility is not limited to the
competent presentation of the facts of the
case. He is also responsible for the competent presentation of the applicable law.
Ethical Consideration 7-23 sets forth the
following observations:
The complexity of law often makes it
difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed
unless the pertinent law is presented by the
lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is
fully informed on the applicable law is
better able to make a fair and accurate
determination of the matter before it. The
adversary system contemplates that each
lawyer will present and argue the existing
law in the light most favorable to his
client.
One may very well inquire as to the limits
of counsel's professional responsibility. For
example, is counsel under a professional
responsibility to disclose to the court a decision directly adverse to his client's case,
and that is unknown to his adversary? The
answer to this question ought to reveal the
true nature of counsel's responsibility and
the duty that he owes not only to his client,

(1946), quoted in K. LLEWELLYN,
238 (1960).
29 See materials cited in E. RE,
AND ORAL ARGUMENT 52 (1965).
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but also to the court and to the legal system
itself.

This particular duty of counsel was formerly dealt with in various opinions of
bar association committees on professional
ethics. Mr. Drinker, a leading authority on
professional ethics of the bar, in 1953
wrote:
The extent to which it is regarded as
counsel's duty to advise the court as to
matters relevant to the proper decision of

the case of which opposing counsel is
ignorant or which he has overlooked turns

on the degree to which the old idea that
litigation is a game between lawyers has
been supplanted by the more modern view
30
that the lawyer is a minister of justice.

Mr. Drinker adds:
Always, however, must be borne in mind

the principle that the theory of our system
is still that justice is best accomplished by
having all the facts and arguments on each
side investigated and presented with maximum vigor by opposing counsel, for
3
decision by the court and jury. '

Relying on respectable authority, and
interpretations of Canon 22 of the former
Canons of Ethics, Mr. Drinker concluded
that:
A lawyer is bound to tell the court of

any decisions directly adverse to any
proposition of law on which he expressly
relies, of which the lawyer on the other
side is apparently ignorant and which
would reasonably be considered important
2
by the judge sitting in the case.3
.30 H.

DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs

31 Id.
32 Id. at 78.

76 (1953).
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In addition to opinions of bar association
committees on legal ethics, considerable
authority has existed which favored disclosure. An excellent exposition is found in the
New Jersey Supreme Court case of In re
Greenberg3 3 decided by Mr. Justice Vanderbilt. All doubt on the question, however,
has been put to rest by the new Code,
which requires disclosure and upholds the
duty of the lawyer as an officer of the
court, or in the beautiful phrase used by
Mr. Drinker, as "a minister of justice."
You will remember that I have referred to
the Code as a recent hopeful sign.
Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B),
Canon 7, expressly provides:

under

In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a
lawyer shall disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to him to be
directly adverse to the position of
his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.
The extent of the responsibility is set
forth as follows in Ethical Consideration
7-23:
Where a lawyer knows of legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction directly
adverse to the position of his client, he
should inform the tribunal of its existence
unless his adversary has done so; but having
made such disclosure, he may challenge its
soundness in whole or in part.
It is to be noted that the new Code of
Professional Responsibility limits the duty
of disclosure to "legal authority in the con-

3 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46 (1954).

trolling jurisdiction directly adverse" to the
position urged. In one respect the new
Code does not adopt the standard of disclosure indicated in Opinion 280 handed
down in 1949 by the American Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances. Opinion 280 stated in part:
We would not confine the Opinion to
"controlling authorities",-i.e., those decisive of the pending case,-but, in accordance with the tests hereafter suggested,
would apply it to a decision directly adverse to any proposition of law on which
the lawyer expressly relies, which would
reasonably be considered important by the
judge sitting on the case. .

.

. The test in

every case should be: Is the decision which
opposing counsel has overlooked one which
the court should clearly consider in deciding the case? Would a reasonable judge
properly feel that a lawyer who advanced,
as the law, a proposition adverse to the
undisclosed decision, was lacking in candor
and fairness to him? Might the judge consider himself misled by an implied representation that the lawyer knew of no
adverse authority?
Mr. Justice Vanderbilt, in the Greenberg
case considered and adopted Opinion 280,
but limited it, however, "to decisions of the
courts of this State and, with respect to
federal questions, to decisions of the courts
of the United States."13 4 In effect, Mr. Jus-

tice Vanderbilt applied the standard or duty
of disclosure presently required by the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Many may
feel that it does not go far enough. Although I, too, agree with that view, and
prefer the test or standard set forth in
Opinion 280, one cannot overlook the
34 Id. at 137, 104 A.2d at 49.
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progress inherent in the express recognition
that the lawyer owes such a duty to the
court and to the legal system. Setting this
responsibility forth in the new Code, and
couching it with the dignity and force of a
disciplinary rule, is properly regarded as a
hopeful sign.

public official. As far back as Alexis de
Tocqueville, in his famous work, Democracy in America, one reads statements such
as: "In all free governments, of whatever
form they may be, members of the legal
profession will be found in the front ranks
3' ' 6
of all parties.

A reading of the Greenberg case will
reveal certain other statements of Mr. Justice Vanderbilt that serve to introduce
another aspect of the subject. These statements also highlight the responsibility of
the lawyer. Mr. Justice Vanderbilt wrote:

Surely the observation is accurate. But it
underscores the role of the lawyer as a
public office holder and his leadership whik
he holds political office. It does not reflect
however, his influence and ability to improve the quality of the administration of
justice by the competent practice of his
profession. It tends to obscure the influence
and contribution of the lawyer in his daily,
and more usual, capacity as an advocate.
There is need to be reminded of the principal role that the lawyer, not only does
perform, but must perform in the deciding
of cases. Furthermore, under our system, it
is a role that only the lawyer can perform.

The process of deciding cases on appeal
involves the joint efforts of counsel and
the court. It is only when each branch of
the profession performs its function properly that justice can be administered to the
satisfaction of both the litigants and society
and a body of decisions developed that will
be a credit to the bar, the courts and the
state. Although the learned jurist and judicial
reformer limited his statements to the "process of deciding cases on appeal," it is
clear that the "joint" effort mentioned applies throughout the entire decisional process, and is not limited to the appellate
process. The cooperative effort, which I
have chosen to call The Partnership of
Bench and Bar, applies to every phase of
the decisional process. Indeed, it is designed
to emphasize and highlight the role and the
contribution of the lawyer in the decisional
process.

Since the usual aspect of a lawyer's work
is that of an advocate, too often one thinks
only of the contribution that the lawyer
makes to the client. None other than
Woodrow Wilson, speaking as a lawyer, in
an address entitled The Lawyer and the
Community, said: "Our duty is a much
larger thing than the mere advice of private
clients." 37 He indicated that "[w]e are
servants of society, officers of the courts of
justice. '"8
It is often forgotten that by the compe-

Too often one thinks only of the influence of the lawyer as a legislator or as a

36 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

35 Id. at 137-38, 104 A.2d at 49.

274 (P. Bradley ed. 1956).
37 Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 35
A.B.A. REP. 419, 421 (1910).
38 Id.
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tent, professional handling of a case, the
lawyer is performing, and has the duty to
perform, a role that must assist the judge
in deciding the case, justly and according
to law. Too often judges, lawyers and the
public, think of the decisional process as
the sole responsibility of the judge. Such
a thought falls far short of the fact, and
does violence to the cooperative effort that
must prevail if the system is to succeed.
It must be admitted, however, that there
is an explanation, if not justification, for
the neglect in the appreciation of the role
of the lawyer in the decisional process. Too
often, in understanding the judicial process,
the concentration of effort has been on the
mental process of the judge. The judicial
process seemed naturally to imply the
judge's mental process. The inquiry seemed
to be: How does the judge decide the case
presented? What factors does he consider
and what are the elements that move him?
A remarkably successful effort to "describe the process" is found in Mr. Justice
Cardozo's lectures entitled The Nature of
the Judicial Process.3 9 His incisive and
penetrating "introspective searchings of the
spirit" 40 have been most helpful. They have
offered insight to countless law students,
and valuable instruction to many grateful
judges. It would be vain or presumptuous
to ask for a finer exposition or discussion of
"the formula," 41 insofar as it may be expressed, according to which American

judges decide cases. But here again the
analysis and effort center around the role
and contribution of the judge. In this lecture I have attempted to extol and give
prominence to the contribution of the
lawyer in that process properly called by
Mr. Justice Cardozo, the "judicial process."
One aspect of the lawyer's work that will
serve to demonstrate the essential nature of
the lawyer's contribution to the judicial
process, is the writing of briefs that are
submitted to the court. This phase of the
lawyer's workaday world can be regarded
as tedious and dull only if one fails to
appreciate its importance in the judicial
decisional process. Once a lawyer is made
to realize the crucial part that a brief can
play in the decision of a case in a particular
way, the writing of a brief will be undertaken with renewed vigor and interest.
Justice Rossman, a former Justice of the
Supreme Court of Oregon, summarized well
the point I wish to make when he wrote:
"If better briefs are written, the courts will
4 2
produce better decisions.
The statement highlights the direct relationship between the input or contribution
of the lawyer, who in the first instance must
prepare the case and submit his authorities
for adjudication, and the end product of
the adjudicatory process, i.e., the judicial
opinion.
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated the point
most candidly when he said: "A judge
rarely performs his functions adequately

31) Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
in SELECTED READINGS OF BENJAMIN
CARDOZO 107, 108 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
40 Id. at 110.
41 Id.

NATHAN
42

Rossman, Appellate Practice and Advocacy,

34 ORE. L. REV. 73 (1955).
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unless the case before him is adequately
presented."4 :
The words selected by the distinguished
jurist are most revealing. The inference is
inescapable that an "adequate" presentation
is required for "adequate" judicial performance. Clearly, if the standard of judicial
performance is to be one of "excellence,"
what is required is an "excellent presentation." This, of course, calls attention to
the fact that the calibre of judges will
reflect the calibre of the bar. More important for our subject, it infers that the
quality of justice and its administration will
also in large measure reflect the calibre of
the bar. Surely no more serious observations can be made to dramatize the key
role of the lawyer and the bar in our society.
The references to brief writing indicate
that by the proper performance of his responsibility to the client, by the competent
and thorough presentation of his case,
counsel is also fulfilling a higher and more
noble function by helping to shape the
judicial opinion and the law itself.
Mr. Whitney North Seymour, a distinguished leader of the bar and a former
president of the American Bar Association,
in an address entitled The Bar as Lawmaker, emphasized this responsibility and
contribution of the bar when he said that:
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would be wrong to omit reference to Webster and the other great advocates whose ar-

guments were accepted and became a part
44
of the ultimate warp and woof of the law.

The reference to the contribution of the
advocate, Daniel Webster, recalls the famous decision of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland.45 For a dramatic example of the specific contribution
of Webster to that decision one ought to
read the contentions of counsel set forth in
the official report of that famous case. Not
only does the Court follow closely the
questions presented and the arguments of
counsel, but it adopts several statements
made by Webster. Indeed, his statement"An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy"-becomes Chief
Justice Marshall's famous utterance that
"[t]he power to tax involves the power to
4;
destroy.'
Many specific examples can be given of
the contribution of the lawyer's brief to
the judicial opinion. Some of these examples reveal the authorship of certain passages and phrases that are well-known to
historians and lawyers. Their origin is often
attributed to the judge who authored the
opinion. As in the example of Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch, research would reveal that many famous phrases represent
the skill and handiwork of lawyers-

The advocate has played a part in the
lawmaking process through the persuading
of judges to decide cases in particular ways.

Thus, in any treatment of Marshall's contribution to American constitutional law, it

43 Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV.
461, 470 (1916).

44 Seymour, The Bar as Lawmaker, in M. PAULSEN, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW

174 (1959). See also Re, The Lawyer as a Lawmaker, 52 A.B.A.J. 159 (1966).
45 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
46 For an interesting discussion of this case in its
historical context, see J. MARKE, VIGNETTES OF
LEGAL HISTORY 42-46 (1965).
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counsel who submitted the case for adjudication.
A search for the original author of
famous or interesting phrases found in
judicial opinions would not be devoid of
good humor. An example may be found in
the Supreme Court decision of Greene v.
McElroy47 wherein Mr. Justice Harlan in a
separate opinion wrote:
It is regrettable that my brother Clark
should have so far yielded to the temptations of colorful characterization as to
depict the issue in this case as being whether
a citizen has a "constitutional right to have
access to the Government's military secrets" . . . 48
With judicial diplomacy and tact, so
typical of that gracious jurist, Mr. Justice
Clark in a footnote to his dissent replied:
My brother Harlan very kindly credits
me with "colorful characterization" in
stating this as the issue. While I take great
pride in authorship, I must say that in this
instance I merely agreed with the statement
of the issue by the Solicitor General and
his co-counsel in five different places in
49
the brief for the United States.
All lawyers will properly deem it to be
high praise for a learned justice to acknowledge "agreement" with counsel's statement
of the issue in the brief. More important,
however, this has practical significance to
the lawyer in the active and daily practice
of his profession. It brings to mind the
suggestion made by the late Professor

47 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
48 Id. at 510.

9 Id. at 511.

Karl N. Llewellyn, who spoke of "the preferred, phrased opinion-kernel." Professor
Llewellyn, in his The Common Law Tradition, stated:
What is wanted is a passage which can
be quoted verbatim by the court, a passage which so clearly and rightly states
and crystallizes the background and the
result that it is recognized on sight as doing
the needed work and as practically demanding to be lifted into the opinion.r 0
All lawyers know, as do all judges, that
there is no substitute for careful and painstaking preparation. Enough has been said,
however, to demonstrate that thorough
preparation is not merely an obligation or
responsibility owed to the client. It is a professional responsibility with ramifications
that directly affect counsel's duty to the
court of which he is an officer, and to
society in general. Although the immediate
objective may be the vigorous presentation
of the case so that he may be successful,
his contribution to the judicial process goes
beyond the success of the moment. His
presentation of the case, if professionally
competent, ought to render valuable assistance to the court or judge charged with the
responsibility of decision.
This realization of the role of counsel
adds a new dimension to the indispensable
requirements of thorough preparation and
competent presentation of a case. The
lawyer, by applying his professional skills,
will succeed in attaining several goals. First,
he will discharge his responsibility to his
client. Second, he will be rendering assis-

50 K.
TION

LLEWELLYN,

241 (1960).
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tance to the court or judge who must decide
the case justly and according to law. And
third, he will be performing a vital public
function in shaping, developing and improving the law itself.

source than selfishness. It is a devotion to
his conception of a useful and worthy institution. But that conception is a distortec
one if it envisages only the cultivation ot
skill without thought of how and to what

This last-mentioned function is perhaps
the most important. Indeed, it is the lawyer's most durable and lasting contribution
to the law. Great lawyers, who have regarded the law as a great profession, have
all stressed this aspect of the lawyer's work.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, for example, in
writing of the functions of the lawyer, stated
that it was a "task of the great lawyer...
to do his part individually and as a member
of the organized bar to improve his profes'51
sion, the courts, and the law."

the power of institutions which have so
successfully mastered the art of penetrating all the intricacies of legal doctrine to
impart a truer understanding of the functions of those who are to be its servants.
That understanding will come, not from
platitudinous exhortation, but from knowledge of the consequences of the failure of
a profession to bear its social responsibilities and what it is doing and may do to
52
meet them.

The professional responsibility inherent
in this aspect of the lawyer's work has been
given new vitality in Canon 8 of the new
Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon
8 declares that "A Lawyer Should Assist
in Improving the Legal System." The canon
is important because it indicates a recognition of the public responsibility of the lawyer as a member of an honorable and
learned profession. It is important also because it is responsive to the exhortation, if
not admonition, of Mr. Justice Harlan F.
Stone:
[Mien serve causes because of their devotion to them. The zeal of the student
for proficiency in law, like that of his elder
brother at the Bar, comes from a higher

5 L Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer:
Service to Clients and to the Public, 40 A.B.A.J.
31 (1954), reprinted in I F. KLEIN & J. LEE,
SELECTED WRITINGS OF ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT
5 (1965).

end it is to be used. .

.

. It is not beyond

I commenced by discussing our adversary system of law and that, as far back as
Dean Pound's famous address, it was a
cause of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. Since the lawyer is admittedly the central participant in that system,
the discussion necessarily had to revolve
around the work or function of the lawyer
in the practice of law, and his role as an
officer of the court. It is my conviction that
the adversary system will work well, and is
deserving of preservation, only if the role
of the lawyer in that system is properly
understood.
It is in the light of the social responsibilities of the lawyer, and the legal
profession, that the lawyer's status may be
correctly perceived. And it is in the perspective of his total responsibilities that
both lawyers and laymen alike can appreciate the utility and wisdom of the adversary
system.

52 Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48
HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1934).
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The adversary system will work provided its participants know its strengths and
weaknesses. For the judge and the lawyer
it is imperative that each also know its
limitations and shortcomings. It will work
well when the lawyer, its central participant, will fulfill all of his responsibilities
with equal zeal-to the client, to the court
and to the law. It will work best when the
lawyer fully appreciates his societal responsibilities in the lofty process in which
he serves. The system will be truly worthy
of preservation and the confidence of the
people when those most responsible for

its proper functioning, lawyers and judges,
will perform their duties in accordance with
the traditions and ideals of both bench and
bar. The acknowledgment of the partnership, and its attendant responsibilities, will
enure to the benefit of society, and will
earn for both bench and bar the gratitude
of all those concerned with the administration of justice. Both lawyers and judges can
then assert with justifiable pride that "we
are the servants of society, the bondservants of justice." 3
53

Wilson, supra note 37, at 439.
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